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Abstract
People usually underestimate time passed since distant events, and
overestimate time passed since recent events. There are several explanations for this “telescoping eﬀect”, but most current explanations utilize
speciﬁc features of human memory and/or human perception. We show
that the telescoping eﬀect can be explained on a much basic level of decision theory, without the need to invoke any speciﬁc ways we perceive and
process time.
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Formulation of the Problem

Telescoping eﬀect. It is known that when people estimate how long ago past
events happened, their estimates are usually biased (see, e.g., [1, 4, 11]):
• for recent events, people usually overestimate how much time has passed
since this event;
• on the other hand, for events in the more distant past, people usually
underestimate how much time has passed since the event.
This phenomenon is called telescoping eﬀect since the bias in perceiving longago past events is similar to what happens when look at the celestial objects
via a telescope: all the objects appear closer than when you look at them with
a naked eye.
How can this eﬀect be explained. There are many explanations for the
telescope eﬀect [1, 4, 11], but most current explanations utilize speciﬁc features
of human memory and/or human perception.
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we show that the telescoping eﬀect
can be explained on a much basic level of decision theory, without the need to
invoke any speciﬁc ways we perceive and process time.
1
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Decision Theory: A Brief Reminder

What is decision theory. Decision theory (see, e.g., [2, 6, 8, 9, 10]) describes
the behavior of a rational person – i.e., a person who, e.g., when deciding that
an alternative A is preferable to alternative B and B is preferable to C, selects
A if presented with two choices: A and C.
Real-life people are not always that rational. This well-known deviations
from rationality are usually caused by our limited ability to process information
in a short time needed to make a decision – this is known as bounded rationality;
see, e.g., [5, 7]. However, overall, decision theory provides a reasonably accurate
description of human behavior.
Utility: the main notion of decision theory. In decision theory, human
preferences are described in terms of a special notion of utility. Utility can be
described as follows. We select:
• a very bad alternative A− (much worse than anything that we will actually
encounter) and
• a very good alternative A+ (much better than what we will actually encounter).
Then, for every value p from the interval [0, 1], we can form a lottery L(p) in
which we get A+ with probability p and A− with the remaining probability
1 − p. For any realistic alternative A:
• for p = 1, the lottery L(p) is equivalent to A+ and is, thus, better than
A: A < A+ = L(1); while
• for p = 0, the lottery L(p) is equivalent to A− and is, thus, worse than A:
A− = L(0) < A.
The larger p, the better the lottery L(p). Thus, there exists a threshold value u
at which we switch from “L(p) is worse than A” to “L(p) is better than A, i.e.,
a value u such that:
• for p < u, we have L(p) < A, and
• for p > u, we have A < L(p).
This value u = u(A) is called the utility of the alternative A. In a reasonable
sense, the alternative A is thus equivalent to the lottery L(u(A)).
The higher the utility value, the better the alternative – since each alternative A is equivalent to the lottery L(p) with p = u(A) and, the higher the
probability p the good event A+ in such a lottery, the better the lottery. So,
among several alternatives, we should select the one with the highest utility
value.
Utility is deﬁned modulo linear transformations. The numerical value of
utility depends on the selection of the alternatives A− and A+ . It can be shown
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that if we select a diﬀerent pair (A′− , A′+ ), then the corresponding utility u′ (A)
is related to the original utility by a linear transformation u′ (A) = a · u(A) + b
for some a > 0 and b; see, e.g., [6, 9].
Decision making under interval uncertainty. In real life, we rarely know
the exact consequences of each action. As a result, for each alternative A,
instead of the exact value of its utility, we often only know the bounds u(A)
and u(A) on this unknown value. In other words, all we know is the interval
[u(A), u(A)] that contains the actual (unknown) value u(A). How can we make
a decision under this interval uncertainty?
In particular, for such an interval case, we need to be able to compare the
interval-valued alternative with lotteries L(p) for diﬀerent values p. As a result
of such comparison, we will come up with a utility of this interval. So, to make
recommendations on decision under interval uncertainty, we need to be able to
assign, to each interval [u, u], a single utility value u(u, u) from this interval that
describes this interval’s utility.
Since utility is deﬁned modulo a linear transformation u → u′ = a · u + b, it
is reasonable to require that the corresponding function u(u, u) should also be
invariant under such transformations, i.e., that:
• if u = u(u, u),
• then u′ = u(u′ , u′ ), where we denoted u′ = a · u + b, u′ = a · u + b, and
u′ = a · u + b.
It turns out that this invariance requirement implies that
u(u, u) = αH · u + (1 − αH ) · u)
for some αH ∈ [0, 1] [6, 9]. This formula was ﬁrst proposed by a future Nobelist Leo Hurwicz and is, thus, known as the Hurwicz optimism-pessimism
criterion [3, 8].
Theoretically, we can have values αH = 0 and αH = 1. However, in practice,
such values do not happen:
• αH = 1 would correspond to a person who only takes into account the best
possible outcome, completely ignoring the risk of possible worse situations;
• similarly, the value αH = 0 would correspond to a person who only takes
into account the worst possible outcome, completely ignoring the possibility of better outcomes.
In real life, we thus always have 0 < αH < 1.
How to take time into account. An event – e.g., a good dinner – a year in
the past does not feel as pleasant to a person now as it may have felt a year
ago. Similarly, a not-so-pleasant event in the past – e.g., a painful inoculation –
does not feel as bad now if it felt a year ago, when it actually happened. Thus,
the utility of an event changes with time: positive utility decreases, negative
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utility increases (i.e., gets closer to 0). If u is the utility of a current event, how
can we describe the utility f (u) of remembering the same event that happened
1 year ago?
We can normalize the utility values by assuming that the status quo situation
has utility 0. Then the only remaining transformation is re-scaling u′ = a · u.
Similarly to the case of interval uncertainty, it is reasonable to require that the
function f (u) is invariant with respect to such a transformation, i.e., that:
• if we have v = f (u),
• then for each a, we should have v ′ = f (u′ ), where we denoted v ′ = a · v
and u′ = a · u.
Substituting the expressions for v ′ and u′ into the formula v ′ = f (u′ ), we conclude that a · v = f (a · u), i.e., a · f (u) = f (a · u). Substituting u = 1 into
def

this formula, we conclude that f (a) = q · a, where we denoted q = f (1). Since
f (u) < u for u > 0, this would imply that q < 1.
So, an event with then-utility u that occurred 1 year ago has the utility q · u
now. Similarly, an event with utility u that happened 2 years ago is equivalent
to q · u a year ago, and thus, is equivalent to q · (q · u) = q 2 · u now. We can
similarly conclude that an event with utility u that occured t moments in the
past is equivalent to utility q t · u now.

3

How Decision Theory Can Explain the Telescoping Eﬀect

People’s perceptions are imprecise. In the ideal situation, an event of
utility u0 that occurred t moments in the past should be equivalent to exactly
the utility u = q t · u0 now. In practice, however, people’s perceptions are
imprecise.
Let us describe this imprecision: ﬁrst approximation. Let us denote by
ε the accuracy of people’s perception. Then, for an event with actual utility
u, the perceived utility can diﬀer by ε, i.e., it can take any value from the
corresponding interval [u − ε, u + ε]. In particular, our perceived utility u of the
past event can take any value from the interval [q t · u0 − ε, q t · u0 + ε].
How we perceive events form the distant past. The above interval can
be somewhat narrowed down if we take into account that for a positive event,
with utility u0 > 0, the perception cannot be negative, while the value q t · u0 − ε
def ln(u0 /ε)
is negative for large t. Thus, when q t · u0 − ε < 0, i.e., when t > T0 =
,
| ln(q)|
the lower bound of the interval is 0, and thus, the interval has the form
[u, u] = [0, q t · u0 + ε].
Based on Hurwicz’s optimism-pessimism criterion, this interval is equivalent
to the value αH · (q t · u0 + ε). How does this translate into a perceived time? For
4

any time tp , the utility of the event tp moments in the past is equal to q tp · u0 .
Thus, the perceived time tp can be found from the condition that the utility
αH · (q t + ε) is equal to q tp · u0 . This equality αH · (q t · u0 + ε) = q tp · u0 implies
that
ln((αH · (q t · u0 + ε))/u0 )
tp =
.
ln(q)
In particular, when t tends to inﬁnity, we have q t → 0 and thus, the perceived
time tends to a ﬁnite constant
ln((αH · ε)/u0 )
.
ln(q)
Thus, for large t we indeed have tp ≪ t, which is exactly what we observe
in the telescoping eﬀect for events from the distant past.
How we perceive very recent events. For recent events, the interval
[q t · u0 − ε, q t · u0 + ε]
can also be somewhat narrowed down if we take into account that the perceived
utility of a past event cannot exceed its utility now, i.e., the value u0 . Thus,
def ln(1 − u0 /ε)
when q t · u0 + ε > u0 , i.e., when q t > 1 − ε/u0 and thus, t < t0 =
,
ln(q)
the upper bound of the interval is 1, and thus, the interval has the form
[u, u] = [q t · u0 + ε, u0 ].
Based on Hurwicz’s optimism-pessimism criterion, this interval is equivalent
to the value αH · u0 + (1 − α) · (q t + ε). Similarly to the distant-past case, the
perceived time tp can be found from the condition that the above value is equal
to q tp · u0 , i.e., that
αH · u0 + (1 − α) · (q t + ε) = q tp · u0 .
This implies that
tp =

ln(αH · u0 + (1 − α) · (q t + ε))
.
ln(q)

In particular, when t tends to 0, we have q t → 1 and thus, the perceived time
tp tends to a ﬁnite positive constant
ln(αH · u0 + (1 − α) · (1 + ε))
.
ln(q)
Thus, for small t, we indeed have tp ≫ t, which is exactly what we observe
in the telescoping eﬀect for recent events.
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